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NATURAL THEOLOGY, METHODOLOGICAL 
NATURALISM, AND "TURTLES ALL 
THE WAY DOWN" 
Del Ratzsch 
Natural theology has not been held in particularly high regard during the past 
century and one half. However, recent developments both within science and 
within philosophy of science offer some new possibilities and resources. In 
what follows I explore some areas and structures within which natural theo-
logical potential might (in principle) emerge. I further argue that the current 
weapon of choice against substantive science / religion intertwining - method-
ological naturalism - not only fails as an inviolable norm, thus leaving the pos-
sibility of a genuine natural theology intact, but that it may even have unhap-
py theological consequences. 
I. Introduction 
Although natural theology is frequently defined as involving what humans 
can learn of God independent of special revelation, the widely held de facto 
picture focuses primarily upon what (if any) theological truths empirical 
(especially scientific) investigation of nature might secure for us. Prospects 
for such science-based natural theology will depend upon the nature and 
capabilities of science, and also upon the connections to theology which 
science might be capable of supporting. In what follows, I will argue that 
resources for natural theology are potentially richer than generally sup-
posed, and that one major possible stumbling block to natural theology 
(methodological naturalism) not only fails to withstand close scrutiny, but 
could even have unfortunate theological consequences. 
II. Scientific inference(s) 
The phrase 'scientific inference' is often taken to suggest that there is 
some single style of reasoning which is definitively and uniquely scientific. 
Such is not, of course, the case. A number of types of reasoning are essen-
tial to various facets of science. Prediction, for instance, may involve 
straightforward implication, but currents often run in the opposite direc-
tion in confirmation - from confirming data back up to confirmed theory. 
There is here a backwash - an inferential ebb tide - with the empirical suc-
cess of a theor:V anchoring its epistemic warrant. In some cases, even in the 
absence of strict inference in any direction a substantive intermeshing - the 
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smooth embedability of a theory into an accepted wider conceptual matrix 
- is taken as constituting support for the embedded theory.! Other cur-
rents are both more complicated and even less directional. For instance, 
the familiar claims that data are theory-laden, or that observation is partly 
constituted by paradigms, have led some to see epistemic feedback loops 
within science.2 And depending upon where the boundaries for scientifi-
cally acceptable explanations are set, 'inference to best explanation' pre-
sents an extremely wide scope for scientific validation. 
Epistemic legitimation can thus move in a variety of directions within 
science. Given that cognitive procedures within science are basically 
honed versions of common sense procedures, it is possible that processes 
generating epistemic legitimation within science may do so beyond science 
as well. For instance, just as empirical success provides backwash confir-
mation to relevant theory, the broader success of science itself might pro-
vide some level of genuine confirmation to the larger philosophical matrix 
within which that science is embedded. 
III. Scientific inference and natural theology: broad possibilities 
It is widely acknowledged that the birth and early development of sci-
ence owe a considerable conceptual and practical debt to the Western 
European Christian intellectual context. Science works only in a very par-
ticular sort of reality and only with a very particular sort of conception of 
reality. The requisite picture - of a comprehend able, intelligible, uniform, 
predictable, even beautiful, cosmos which can in principle make sense to 
finite minds like ours when observed via perceptual faculties like ours - is a 
picture of a cosmos structured in fundamental ways like a mind would do 
it. It is a picture of a cosmos structured like a creation. Although details are 
disputed, that Christian doctrines of creation and of divine voluntarism 
provided a hospitable matrix for science is not in dispute. 
As noted above, smooth interlockings of that sort within science are typi-
cally taken to have confirmatory force. But surely natural theology could 
perfectly properly avail itself of the variant types of legitimate scientific 
inference, and should reap some degree of the same epistemic legitimacy 
produced by those processes wholly within science. So an epistemic back-
wash to the philosophical presuppositions of science and on back to the 
theological principles which historically provided their foundations and 
within which they smoothly embed, would seem both in principle 
unproblematic and productive of epistemic significance. 
Even deeper potential arises in other ways. First, the possibility of theo-
ry-Iadeness of data suggests that currents may sometimes even carry sub-
stance as welP If so, then content may migrate among fundamental pre-
supposition, theory, and observational data. Historically, varying concep-
tions of reality, of the proper aims of science, of the proper conceptual 
resources available (or not) to science, of the relative importance of compet-
ing epistemic values within science, and so forth have both affected and 
been affected by developments within science, within philosophy, and 
within theology (not to mention the broader social context in general). Just 
as observational data may be theory-laden, theories in this circumstance 
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may be metaphysics- or even theology-laden. 
Second, it is sometimes argued that conceptual structure and content are 
not cleanly separable - that at least in (subtle) part structure is content. 
That, if true, has significant implications. As briefly noted above, the early 
modem Western European Christian intellectual context provided concep-
tual resources essential to the very existence and rise of science. That the 
(at least implicit) relevance of theological conceptual shapes is not mere his-
torical curiosity is suggested by physicist Paul Davies: 
Science began as an outgrowth of theology, and all scientists, whether 
atheists or theists ... accept an essentially theological worldview.4 
If Davies is correct (and I think that he is) then science seems to (still) 
require a deep theological shape - a theological Cheshire cat's skeleton. 
And if structure contributes to content, then here again is subtle natural 
theological potential. As one example, I have elsewhere argued that the 
logical character typically attributed to natural law - nomological necessity, 
lying between logical necessity and accidental generalization yet support-
ing counterfactuals - is best, or perhaps only, accounted for in terms of 
counterfactuals of God's freedom.s 
Third, it is widely held that metaphor plays an indispensable role in the-
oretical understandings. That would carry the potential - indeed the 
inevitability - of structure and content flowing into even the most arcane 
and abstruse scientific levels. As Dirac once remarked: 
Nature's fundamental laws ... control a substratum of which we can-
not form a mental picture without introducing irrelevancies" 
Fourth, if out of conceptual embedding and interactions any theis-
tic substance flows, at least some whiff of that will nearly inevitably make 
its way into science 'proper.' That some theories have particular world-
view atmospheres is evident. For instance, least action theories are virtual-
ly invisible to anyone outside the inner precincts of physics - almost as if 
not quite fit for polite society. Why the obscurity? The reason may have to 
do in part with least action's dark past. As one physicist notes, 
Maupertuis's 
original statement of the principle [of least action] ... was vaguely 
theological and could hardly pass muster today.'" 
And that theological air lingers. Max Planck noted that 
[W]hat we must regard as the greatest wonder of all, is the fact that the 
most adequate formulation of this law creates the impression in every 
unbiased mind that nature is ruled by a rational, purposive will.8 
Yet, contrary to the standard wisdom on such matters, that deep 
theological air does not interfere with genuine scientific scope, power, 
effectiveness, elegance, applicability, predictiveness or substance. Planck 
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elsewhere observed: 
Amid the more or less general laws which mark the achievements of 
physical science during the course of the last centuries, the principle 
of least action is perhaps that which ... may claim to come nearest to 
[the] ideal final aim of theoretical research [i.e., to "condense all nat-
ural phenomena which have been observed and are still to be 
observed into one simple principle"]9 
IV. Rising stakes 
(a) Backwash and pricetags. 
That conveyed ethos does not sit comfortably with certain world-
views. We intuitively sense something like what c.s. Lewis once referred 
to as a "repugnance of atmospheres" between regnant naturalistic, secular 
predispositions and this conveyed impression of a governing "rational, 
purposive will." Quite a lot of people (not all of them necessarily anti-reli-
gious) are alarmed at the prospect of science lending weight to theism, and 
especially at the picture of theological currents running through science 
itself. Indeed, according to Harvard biologist Richard Lewontin, that latter 
is exactly what the whole structure of 'scientific method' is specifically 
designed to protect us all from: 
Our willingness to accept claims which are against common sense is 
the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and 
the supernatural. We take the side of science ... because we have a 
prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the 
methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a 
material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, 
that we are forced by our a priori adherence of material causes to create 
an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce mate-
rial explanations, no matter how counterintuitive, no matter how 
mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover that materialism is absolute, 
for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.lD [emphasis mine] 
Thus according to Lewontin and many others, any wisp of a theistic atmos-
phere is to be rigidly excluded from science 'proper.' 
But such exclusion carries a higher potential scientific pricetag than gen-
erally realized. Given interconnections, multi-directional content currents, 
and so forth, the only way to shield particular parts of science from a back-
wash from specific results carrying theistic overtones might be to excise 
from science itself the factors generating those initial theology-suggestive 
specific results. That would of course undercut some prospects for legiti-
mate science-based natural theology. But depending upon what had to be 
excised from within science, it might do so by partially impoverishing sci-
ence itself. 
On the opposite end, if the deep theistic foundations underlying science 
'leak' into science, then if the only way to stop the leaks is to remove from 
science any connection to the offending foundation, then either science 
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must take essential presuppositions as 'brute', or else science must be 
deprived of the relevant foundational resources. In any case, if nature is a 
creation, and if that is in fact why science with its essential presuppositions 
works, and if the success of science generates a confirmatory backwash 
then the demand that science not speak of such matters entails (awkwardly 
enough) that science is forbidden to acknowledge some truths which it 
itself confirms. 
(b) Backwash, demarcation and gatekeepers 
Justifying exclusionary prohibitions may be not only more costly, 
but also more difficult than usually realized. Any attempt to construct a 
conceptual gatekeeper for science would seem to require at least a partial 
solution to the old (perhaps intractable) demarcation problem. Beyond 
that, the category blurring generated by content migration would dim 
prospects for clear demarcation even further. And as my colleague 
Stephen Wykstra has argued, (conceptions of) the character, behavior and 
status of genuine nature in a theistic, created, and designed universe might 
be very different from (conceptions of) the undesigned chance Nature of a 
non-theistic, non-created universe. l1 If science is supposed to focus soley 
upon the natural, then different conceptions of the natural will affect con-
ceptions of and within science. Conceptions of achievable aims, epistemic 
values, plausibility structures, expectations, theoretical resources, evalua-
tive tilts, and normative methodologies as well as anticipated structures, 
components, and governance of 'nature' itself might be very different in 
theistic and non-theistic universes. So even waiving the usual problems 
with demarcation, one might still be unable to formulate defensible demar-
cation criteria without some sort of de facto assumptions concerning 
whether we are in a theistic or non-theistic universe. 
v. Exclusion: methodological naturalism 
Whatever the potential costs and difficulties, exclusion is contemporary 
orthodoxy and although there are claims that science presupposes philo-
sophical naturalism12, the exclusionary principle of choice for most is 
methodological naturalism, often characterized as follows: 
Philosophical naturalism mayor may not be correct (science itself 
simply takes no position), but since science cannot deal with the 
supernatural, it is an essential methodolOgical principle of science 
that science must proceed as if philosophical naturalism is correct.13 
Standard justifications for methodological naturalism can be categorized 
as conceptual, pragmatic, or empirical. Conceptual attempts involve either 
bare stipulations that science just is methodologically naturalistic (e.g., 
Michael Ruse, Robert Pennock) or appeals to preferred definitions of sci-
ence (e.g., Eugenie Scott, Nancey Murphy).14 The most compelling prag-
matic justification involves the overwhelming attractions of scientific lazi-
ness.IS For instance, Pennock: 
Once such supernatural explanations are permitted they could be 
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used in chemistry and physics as easily as Creationists have used 
them in biology and geology. Indeed, all empirical investigation 
beyond the purely descriptive could cease, for scientists would have 
a ready-made answer for everything.16 
The precise risk is that if it were permissible to countenance design, 
supernatural agency, and the like in science, then scientists might abandon 
searches too soon, settling for easy - non-natural - alternatives.17 And such 
easy solutions are scientific dead ends given the standard contention that 
references beyond nature are empirically empty. That empirical emptiness 
plus the conviction that there is nothing explanatory of any sort left to be 
explored or said once investigation reaches the supernatural arena, under-
lies the common assertion that anything non-natural constitutes a "science-
stopper." And beyond that, it is claimed, scientific progress historically has 
flowed exclusively in the wake of recognition of the empirical vacuity of 
non-natural theories, and methodological naturalistic prohibitions now 
stand solidly justified by their past empirical payoff. 
(a) Some cautions. 
None of those justifications is bulletproof. First, it is worth keeping in 
mind that definitional attempts are prima facie problematic for the simple 
reasons that no one actually has a completely workable definition of science 
(nor even necessary and sufficient conditions), and that proposed defini-
tions have been historically unstable. In any case, definitions are human 
constructions, and why human definitions should be normative for truth 
concerning the objective cosmos is unclear.18 
Second, the laziness worry is indeed legitimate, and methodological nat-
uralism as a first approximation pragmatic (but defeasible) strategy may 
well be defensible - even crucial. But such pragmatic considerations would 
not support inviolable prohibitions. And in any case, there is a corre-
sponding opposing hazard - the risk of refusing to recognize when it is 
time to quit. Refusing to abandon the search for a perpetual motion 
machine in the belief that scientists had adopted e.g., the second law out of 
a lazy reluctance to slog onward with the demanding search for perpetual 
motion could have been as prejudicial to science as quitting too soon in 
some other areas. 
(b) History: pro and can 
Furthermore, the history presupposed above is seriously suspect, on 
several counts. First, neither science or scientists may be so vulnerable to 
the temptations of intellectual sloth as presumed. Indeed, the history of 
science would suggest that the risks are not that great on precisely this point. 
Historically, no disaster such as that darkly suggested by Pennock 
occurred. In fact, if the history of science told by critics of teleology, cre-
ationism, intelligent design, and the like is accurate, during the 19th centu-
ry previously entrenched supernatural design explanations lost the scientif-
ic battle to mere fledgling naturalistic explanations - hardly what one 
would expect if merely allowing currently disenfranchised supernatural 
design explanations into the conversation were likely to destroy current 
mature and robust natural science. Thomas Huxley once remarked that: 
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Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every new science as 
the strangled snakes beside [the cradle] of Hercules.19 
If the infant Hercules could strangle the serpents that surrounded his cra-
dle, it is not terribly likely that the adult Hercules would be done in by 
rogue nightcrawlers. 
Beyond that, non-natural and teleological approaches within science 
have sometimes historical been quite fruitfuPO Furthemore, pursuit of suc-
cessful strategies in science may not have been the only thing that drove 
exclusion of the non-natural. On the contrary, it is evident that e.g. Huxley 
and others operated from a prior commitment to naturalism, materialism 
and/ or mechanism in their primary work.21 (And recall Lewontin's state-
ment above.) If key scientific passages were driven by such prior philo-
sophical demands and agendas, the fact (if it is such) that the path of sci-
ence has led away from the non-natural would have reduced significance. 
But still, might not history tell us at least something in this region? For 
instance, it might be argued that naturalism has come to characterize sci-
ence (whatever the reason), and science so characterized has experienced 
unrivaled success. Surely, then, this naturalism - whatever its roots -
enjoys substantial backwash confirmation, removing any lingering need to 
appeal to theism. Perhaps. But theism at least holds its own here. 
Indeed, key presuppositions required by science and consonant with the-
ism - e.g. of an orderly and intelligible cosmos - seem to be even more sci-
entifically indispensible than are any presuppositions of naturalism. Given 
an orderly, intelligible universe, science could still operate whether or not 
naturalism of any sort were assumed. There are a number of very simple 
existence proofs of that fact: e.g., Newton. Historically, a number of major 
scientists took 'natural' laws to be simply manifestations of direct, 
moment-to-moment divine activity, and their science did not particularly 
suffer from it.;~ But in the absence of this mind-redolent uniformity, intelli-
gibility, and the like, attempts to construct a science even given the 
assumption of virtually any type of naturalism will fail. 
So if empirical success constitutes empirical confirmation of operative 
presuppositions, the fact that a reality which is de facto creation-friendly is 
presupposed by science in an even more essential way than is any form of 
naturalism, suggests that the success of science tells at least as much in 
favor of the deeper, more crucial mind-suggestive presuppositions as it 
does any of the structurally more superficial mind-denying naturalistic 
presuppositions.23 
Of course, most scientists don't seem to take the success of science as 
either payoff or confirmation of theistic presuppositions. But believers and 
unbelievers both do feel a theistic tug here. For instance, nature does 
sometimes just clobber us with the conviction of designedness - as even 
Darwin testified.24 And Crick's perception of the strength of that impulse is 
such to induce him to issue a warning: 
Biologists must constantly keep in mind that what they see was not 
designed, but rather evolved.2s 
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And again, it is not necessarily irrelevant that it was not until nature 
was looked at as a product of design - i.e., as a creation - that science itself 
really got off the ground. Blanket stipulative prohibitions (definitional or 
otherwise) against exactly that initiating intuition would seem to demand 
extraordinary justification. 
The related claim - that non-natural theories have no empirical import, 
content, or consequences - is not obviously true in any case. On a very 
general level, John Leslie says: 
Strong evidence for something ... is whatever causes a puzzlement 
which the existence of that something would reduce or remove ... 26 
In that sense, the existence of other universes, for instance, might I explain' 
fine-tuning in this one.27 But by precisely that same principle the empirical-
ly determinable fine-tuning of our world would constitute empirical evi-
dence for supernatural design as well. One could, of course, adopt a philos-
ophy which enshrines ultimate puzzlement/8 but its status as philosophy 
should not be overlooked. 
VI. Prohibitions - consequences in principle 
The basic problem with pre-stipulated boundaries is that if reality 
chooses to ignore our restrictions (and why on earth shouldn't it?), then 
theorizing forbidden to cross those boundaries will inevitably be either 
incomplete or skewed.29 That could be particularly problematic were reali-
ty an integrated unity - a true cosmos - with theistically-suffused principles 
of structure and governance shaping the character of the empirical realm. 
In that case, insistence that theorizing about one category of aspects sys-
tematically refuse to acknowledge other categories of aspects appears 
risky. And that is especially true given the apparent pervasiveness of 
backwash effects at all levels, and given the interplay between substantive 
matters within science and its embedding conceptual matrix. 
Of course, it might be claimed that incompleteness of science is unsur-
prising - that science does not claim to be complete, that science cheerfully 
admits to realms of reality which it does not address. Perhaps - although 
that depends upon exactly who is doing the talking. 3D But if science is not 
competent to all reality, then the freedom to recognize when to quit pursu-
ing specific programmes becomes imperative. 
But even just methodological naturalism conjoined with aspirations for 
completeness has substantive implications. First, if one restricts science to 
the natural, then assumes that science can in principle get to all truth, then 
one has implicitly presupposed philosophical naturalism. 31 But even if one 
merely stipulates methodological naturalism as essential to science, then 
assumes only that science is competent for all physical matters, or that 
what science (properly conducted in the long run) does generate concern-
ing the physical realm will in principle be truth, then if the truth of the spe-
cific matter in question is non-natural, even the most excruciatingly proper 
naturalistic scientific deliverances on that matter may be wide of the mark, 
typically in exactly the way a science built on philosophical naturalism would be.32 
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For practical purposes, that comes close to importing philosophical natural-
ism into the structure of science. 
(a) Further implications 
So whether methodological naturalism has substantive philosophi-
cal implications depends upon what it operates in tandem with. At the 
least, methodological naturalism makes the de facto assumption that there 
is an identifiable realm of reality which is in scientifically relevant respects 
functionally self-contained and operationally de-coupled from the super-
natural. That assumption is neither obvious, trivial, nor - since it is an 
empirical universal negative - demonstrable.33 
In any case, if there are relevant but non-natural truths within the struc-
ture and governance of the cosmos, a science forbidden the requisite con-
ceptual resources will be unable to accommodate (or acknowledge or 
maybe even recognize) those truths. And given that possibility, the widely 
accepted 'self-corrective' ability of science will be jeopardized. 
(b) Stoppers 
One further consideration involves the "science-stopper" concern. 
The claim that non-natural theories would point to (or admit of) no further 
explorations beyond themselves (e.g., "that's just how God did it" - end of 
story) may not be completely true34, but even if it were, it remains to be 
shown that that is all bad. It is at least possible that in some areas that 
accurately represents the truth of the matter. And a natural science which 
is forbidden to stop its natural explaining where the natural explanation 
actually stops faces some epistemic difficulties. 
A strict methodological naturalism is basically a stipulation that at every 
level of explanation the next, more fundamental level of explanation (if 
any) must also be sought within the explanatory resources of the natural. 
In any area where a genuine, satisfactory explanation can only be found 
beyond the natural realm, one's alternatives seem to be (a) abandoning sci-
ence (at least by that definition) in that area, (b) chOOSing an arbitrary 
stopping point, or (c) pursuing a regress of 'natural' and ex hypothesi incor-
rect explanations through successive levels. 
A non-naturalistic theory, on the other hand, might constitute a regress-
stopper. Naturalism of any sort has no relevant regressing-spiking 
resources beyond chance, brute fact, or some sort of necessity - from none 
of which conceptual promise just beams.35 That lack might explain why 
doctrinaire naturalists such as Peter Atkins find themselves driven to say-
ing startling things like this: 
When we have dealt with the values of the fundamental constants by 
seeing that they are unavoidably so, and have dismissed them as 
irrelevant, we shall have arrived at complete understanding. 
Fundamental science then can rest.36 
(c) Turtles all the way down 
Since none of the easily-available naturalistic resources constitute 
satisfactory stopping points, naturalism is destined to have no principial 
justification for quitting, no matter how appropriate quitting might be. But 
unending explanatory sequences (whether infinitely varying, repetitive, or 
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regressive) are not logically attractive. Consider the old story about a claim 
that the earth rested upon the back of an elephant. When asked what held 
up the elephant, the claimant responded that the elephant stood upon the 
back of a turtle. When questioned as to what held the turtle up, appeal 
was made to another turtle. That turtle, it emerged under further question-
ing, stood upon the back of yet another turtle. Then faced yet again with 
another round of the same question, the claimant exasperatedly shortcut 
further (potentially interminable) hounding by declaring that the under-
pinnings of the earth consisted of "turtles all the way down." 
That is widely taken to be obviously - and laughably - explanatorily 
fraudulent. And the problem is not reference to turtles - nearly anything all 
the way down would constitute the same fraud. The problem is the clearly 
suspect assumption that infinite repetitions of the same explanatory 
resources whose evident incompleteness on even the first level was what 
triggered the sequence of questions could make ultimate explanatory 
headway.37 
But if "turtles all the way down" is problematic, then "naturalism all the 
way down" may be as well. Yet that is precisely the assumption to which 
an unending allegiance to methodological naturalism in science apparently 
commits one. It is possible to simply bite various bullets and claim that 
there really is no ultimate explanation, that brute givens are the final 
answer, that reality just is a wildly lucky chance, that basic scientific princi-
ples are logically necessary, or that there really are turtles all the way 
down. But it is hard to see why anyone should be rationally obliged to do 
any of that. 
VII. Prohibitions - consequences in practice? 
Interesting as the foregoing 'in principle' risks might be, are there any 
traces of actual effects of even the most unbending methodological natural-
ism? There are certainly hints. For instance, with respect to the origin and 
diversity of biological life on earth, there are no serious naturalistic candi-
dates beyond evolution. Since methodological naturalism says that natu-
ralistic candidates constitute the entire catalogue of acceptable theories, 
evolutionary theory becomes the scientific default position. That is 
emphatically not to say that the empirical evidence does not in fact strongly 
support evolutionary theory, but it decidedly does mean that the relation 
between theory (facing no admissible challengers) and empirical data risks 
becoming anomalous. And in fact one does see from a number of promi-
nant evolutionists (e.g., Ruse, Eldridge, and Futuyma) surprisingly explicit 
admission of a potential disconnect between actual truth and permissible 
biological science (e.g., creationism "is not necessarily wrong ... but it is not 
science")38, and closely related assertions from some others (e.g., Pennock, 
Dawkins, and Brauer and Brumbaugh)39. However, I shall focus here on a 
more current case. 
Prohibitions and cosmology 
Cosmology offers intriguing examples of methodological (and philosoph-
ical) naturalism generating both resistance to some design-friendly ideas and 
overly tenacious allegiance to other design-aversive ideas - i.e., both confor-
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mity to prohibitions and resistance to timely quitting. Some of the well-
known initial resistance to Big Bang cosmology (due to its resemblance to 
creation-ex-nihilo theologies) might be classified as the former, while the 
associated refusal of Hoyle and others to abandon steady-state cosmologies 
(pursuing them even to the point where they implied that the majority of the 
known universe was anomalous) might fit under the latter heading. 
Cosmology is a not-unlikely place for influences not wholly empirical to 
emerge. The field is historically relatively new, it strains at the edge of sci-
ence's observational capabilities, the scope of its theories is huge (cosmic, 
even), and given the trickiness and relative scarcity of data and given that 
tying sometimes-equivocal data to often-difficult theory is a delicate mat-
ter, enormous theoretical edifices often have comparatively tiny empirical 
footprints and fairly ethereal scaffolding. Of course, any full-bodied theo-
retical structure must get its full complement of content somewhere, and 
where data are tenuous substance may - sometimes must - be borrowed 
from other components of the larger conceptual matrix. 
Of present interest is the continuing debate involving fine tuning, cos-
mological anthropic principles, and many-universe cosmologies. It was for 
many centuries believed that life and species resulted from deliberate, 
direct design. Darwin proposed an evolutionary mechanism which could 
(it was argued) generate (or mimick) apparent exquisite biological design 
by blind, natural means - random variation sieved by natural selection 
(plus some auxiliary processes). It was noted, however (even by Darwin)4o 
that evolution itself depended upon conditions and processes specific 
enough to themselves suggest design. Subsequent scientific developments 
revealed just how specific the conditions had to be - and how special and 
improbable a place the Earth was. Of course, the primary traditional 
means of overcoming unfavorable odds is to multiply tries. The apparent 
vastness of the cosmos, with its presumed numerous and varied planets 
(perhaps 107 in our galaxy alone) seemed to offer ample opportunities for 
the cosmos to produce suitable planets purely by chance. However, it 
began looking as if the laws, constants, and boundary conditions necessary 
just to produce planets within a Big Bang cosmology were themselves sub-
ject to wildly tight constraints. By one estimate, the odds of all relevant fac-
tors being 'tuned' for the bare production of planets (let alone life) were 
one in 1022'1,"1 Such apparent 'fine tuning' got the attention even of those 
unsympathetic to non-natural explanations. 
There was, of course, a readily available non-natural explanation: that 
the basic nomic structures and boundary conditions of the cosmos looked 
deliberately designed because they were designed - the laws, conditions, 
and parameters even of the Big Bang itself having been delicately adjusted 
for subsequent life. Both within and outside science, rational explanation 
typically trumps brute fact non-explanations, so the ready availability of a 
non-natural explanation for the empirically determinable character of the 
cosmos created conceptual pressure for philosophical naturalists.42 
The subsequent response is well known. Since, again, the standard 
mechanical procedure for overcoming unfavorable odds is to multiply 
tries, the available naturalistic recourse was to multiply randomly-varying 
universes - indeed, to proliferate them to the degree required to swamp 
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odds on the order of one in 1010'23:3 (Some simply postulated infinitely 
many worlds, or even all possible worlds.44 ) 
Of course, on most tellings, the alternative universes are mutually inac-
cessible, meaning that from our world their empirical status is tenuous at 
best:s Confirming their actual existence seems problematic. Falsifying 
their actual existence seems problematic. There must also presumably be 
some natural mechanism for generating those worlds. There have been a 
number of proposed mechanisms - all of which are, of course, seriously 
speculative. Postulation of this thicket of universes more nearly resembles 
philosophical hope than empirical science.46 
Furthermore it appears that stepping back one level does not solve any 
of the really fundamental problems. The production of multiple worlds 
intuitively would seem to require a structure of mechanisms, conditions 
and capabilities at least as demanding - or fine tuned - as the worlds being 
produced. John Leslie, for instance, remarks that: 
Even when a Grand Unified Theory is selected cunningly to achieve 
the desired results - which ... can look suspiciously like the 'fine tun-
ing' which the inflationary hypothesis is so often praised for render-
ing unnecessary - you may still be forced to postulate a gigantic space 
containing rare regions in which inflation of the right type occurs:7 
Others have made similar points (in this and related contexts ):" 
Richard Dawkins has (ill-temperedly) remarked that design theories 
attempting to explain complexity in terms of a designer of even greater 
complexity are "cowardly and dishonest":9 Why the same moral oppro-
brium should not attach to those trying to explain the fine tuning of our 
cosmos in terms of a comparably fine-tuned world-ensemble and world-
ensemble generator is not clear.") 
VIII. Regresses and recursions 
In adding infinitely many universes, one may not be getting any ultimate 
explanatory traction, and may be importing more - and worse - puzzles 
than those with which one began. Of course, similar things could be 
alleged concerning theistic theories as well. They add not only an addi-
tional level of complexity (a creator / designer), but one which perhaps 
imports even more puzzles than does an ensemble of other universes. 
But there are intriguing differences. The rough history, recall, is almost 
cyclic. Something appears to be a likely product of deliberate design. But 
(often for philosophical reasons) a natural, mechanistic, non-design expla-
nation is nonetheless sought. Once accepted, that explanation itself 
requires factors and conditions which in their tum seem to be likely candi-
dates for a design explanation. But some deeper-level natural, mechanistic, 
non-design explanation is again sought, and when one is accepted it too 
exhibits characteristics that invite a design explanation. 
It is tempting to suggest that since we never get rid of the initial appear-
ance of the need for design explanations at each level, that that need consti-
tutes an explanatory requirement (turtles) all the way down, indicating 
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that the only sort of explanation which can stop the regress is a design 
explanation. The response, of course, is that whatever the explanatory 
temptation at each level, that natural and mechanical explanations have 
ultimately proven adequate at each of those successive levels, and that if 
iterations cut any ontological ice, any turtle-dependent case for design is 
paralleled by an equally powerful case for naturalism. 
That counter cannot be casually dismissed. But there is a difference. 
Although the same type of demand arises at each new level, the naturalistic 
explanatory resources demanded at each level escalate. The problem fac-
ing the naturalist at each level is to overcome unfavorable (typically pro-
hibitive) odds - the odds against earth conditions being just right by 
chance, the odds against the boundary conditions of the Big Bang being 
just right by chance, the odds against the laws and constants of the cosmos 
(or the megaverse) being just right by chance, and so forth. The strategy 
again is to multiply tries. But tries must be multiplied at each level. And 
getting the right factor f at level L by multiplying tries at that level requires 
a broader mechanism than f operating at L -! - a mechanism whose output is 
both f and variants upon f. Thus, to get the right sort of planet requires a 
mechanism operating at a level more fundamental than the planetary level 
- at the planet-producing level - and with the capacity for producing huge-
ly many and varying planets. To get the right sort of universe requires a 
mechanism operating at a level more fundamental than the mere universe 
level - at the universe-producing level - and with the capacity for produc-
ing hugely many and varying universes. Thus, every explanatory retreat 
to a production mechanism at a deeper level involves not only escalation of 
demands, but a profound broadening of the scope, capacity and powers of 
the mechanisms demanded. 
But where in the (or any) world does one go for a broader mechanism 
than that which produces not only multiple universes, but perhaps infinite-
ly many universes?5! The situation resembles not only a regress, but a 
rapidly degenerating regress at that - a classic Kuhnian case of the growth 
of explanatory demands and complexities outstripping increases in 
explanatory payoffs. 
If that is the case, then unless arbitrarily halted at some level, doctrinaire 
conformity to methodological naturalism will guarantee that cosmology is 
driven into sterility. Without some sort of stopper - a cosmological telom-
ere - science simply frays away. (The earlier Atkins quote represents an 
attempt to finesse the problem, but I know of no empirical support for that 
hopeful proposal.) By contrast at each successive level L, precisely the same 
design resources - e.g., a supernatural being - which would have been ade-
quate at the lower level will be adequate at Las well.52 
VIII. Natural theology again 
Methodological naturalism may, again, be strategically important. 
But it not only fails to be a universal trump card but depending upon how 
inflexibly it is wielded has the potential for scientific disfunction. Prospects 
for the varieties of natural theology suggested earlier are thus so far forth 
still live. Indeed, a few suggestive points can now emerge. 
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First, it is at the least intriguing that fine-tuning - with its sugges-
tion of intentionality - has arisen out of a scientific context specifically con-
structed (on Lewontin's telling) to preclude exactly such suggestions. 
Maybe the cosmos is positively insisting on telling us something whether 
we propose to hear it or not. Not only did the suggestion emerge unbid-
den, but bringing it to heel has proven particularly problematic and costly. 
Throughout most scientific history, simplicity, elegance and other allied 
considerations played substantive roles in theory construction and evalua-
tion. One standard element in such legitimately scientific considerations 
was 'Ockham's Razor'. Yet, the impulse to avoid design conceptions (and 
associated natural theology possibilities) at the cost of huge rafts of uni-
verses looks like abandonment of that principle.53 Paul Davies, for 
instance, remarks that 
Invoking an infinite number of other universes just to explain the 
apparent contrivances of the one we see is pretty drastic, and in stark 
conflict with Occam's razor.54 
In the case of infinitely many universes, Ockham would be well advised to 
bring along more than a mere razor - perhaps something more like a chain-
saw. 
Furthermore, the dynamic and structure of the escape attempts are sug-
gestive as well. That the successive layers of proposed naturalistic cosmo-
logical explanations differ at each explanatory level but never discharge the 
mystery of the recurring fine-tuning may constitute an explanatory regress, 
while the same possible design explanation being conceptually adequate at 
each level might suggest that the parallel design track exhibits an explana-
tory recursion, whose stable character really does indicate an ultimate, 
foundational fact of reality. There is potentially a difference here which 
might indicate a foundational priority of design over ultimate brute 
mechanical naturalism. Just as repetition of pattern at each successive scale 
in a Mandlebrot picture reveals a fundamental and stable scale-invariant 
structure in the equations producing it, it may be that a repetition of 
design-suggestive and design-explainable pattern at successive levels in 
cosmological explanations reveals a fundamental structure at the core of 
the cosmos. In short, if design-suggestive structures reappear at each new 
level of analysis, and if (as argued earlier) design-related matters are con-
ceptually more fundamental than naturalism it may be that the turtles not 
only do not go all the way down, but that even whatever turtles there are 
are in fact designed. 
And finally, there is one broader matter. As noted earlier, doctrinaire 
stipulation of naturalism (methodological or otherwise) risks skewing even 
purely empirical results in some areas of scientific investigation. That seems 
to be especially plausible in worlds that are created. But there is a further 
risk. It has recently been argued that the only plausible justification for vari-
ous science-essential presuppositions is that our perceptual, conceptual, and 
other cognitive systems were deliberately designed for catching onto specific 
types of truth. But if an omnipotent supernatural being deliberately con-
structed both our cognitive structures and the natural world we investigate 
450 Faith and Philosophy 
via those structures, it is clearly possible that we and the world were coordi-
nately fashioned in such a way that features of nature as comprehended by 
our epistemic faculties would reveal to us specified features of the maker of 
both. Suppose that not only was the creation intended to speak to us con-
cerning its creator, but that creation's voice was multileveled - some things 
being audible only through particular results discoverable only scientifically. 
Processes which either skew or truncate the picture of nature science gener-
ates could obscure the very features of nature in question, obscuring in turn 
what nature was meant at that point to say. Unbending application of even 
methodological naturalism might thus preferentially position science pre-
cisely to miss natural-theology-relevant deep features of nature, and might 
consequently force us to miss their theological import. 
IX. Conclusion 
Both scientific progress and deeper philosophical understanding of 
science reveal richer prospects for a science-rooted natural theology than 
standard cultural myth would have it. And the obstacle of choice -
methodological naturalism - although perhaps indispensible as a provi-
sional pragmatic scientific strategy is dubious as a norm. To wield it as 
a theistic (or design, or natural theology) conversation-stopper around 
science leaps well beyond any justification it can muster, any track 
record it can cite, and any future promise it can seriously make. Indeed, 
a doctrinaire prohibition on what one is permitted qua scientist to think, 
may ultimately not only work to the detriment of empirical science, but 
may obscure or contort deeper theological messages nature may carry. 
Although he undoubtedly did not mean it as I shall use it, Nobel physi-
ologist Christian DeDuve recently remarked: 
We need a pathway, a succession of chemical steps leading from the 
first building blocks of life to the RNA world. Chemistry, however, 
has so far failed to elucidate this pathway. At first sight, the kind of 
chemistry needed seems so unlikely to take place spontaneously that 
one might be tempted to invoke, as many have done and some still 
do, the intervention of some supernatural agency. Scientists, howev-
er, are condemned by their calling to look for natural explanations of 
even the most unnatural-looking events.55 [my emphasis] 
Perhaps in these politically correct and postmodern times we should 
free the scientists.56 
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